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Soraj Hongladarom

Cultures and Global Justice

 
Summary

This paper aims at proposing a model of global justice which pays respect to cultural differences. Recent advances in technology have made it necessary that the notion of justice be reconsidered. Onora O'Neill's conception of justice is based on Kant's ethics. This, however, is found wanting because when considered against the need for guidelines for action in cases of the influx of technological advances into the Third World, for example, the conception appears too formal and remote. The proposed model, based on Walzer's 'thick' and 'thin' morality, aims at keeping both global and local elements of justice together and stresses a model of global justice in which local cultures have a significant role.


Content

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Introduction
Global Social Justice, Digital Divide, Genetically Modified Organisms
Justice, Technology and Culture
Paucity of the Kantian Conception
Conclusion: Justice as Both Cultural and Intercultural



 Introduction

»In the current era of globalization, where cultures intermingle, where can one find justice among the cultures? Is there one universal system of justice which all cultures should adopt?«




1

  What I would like to do in this paper is to try to offer a sketch of a conception of social justice which is global in scope and which answers some of the salient questions centering on how such a global conception of justice itself does justice to different cultural traditions. Contemporary globalization results in an increasing use of global communication network. Ideas, services, merchandises, words, images, sounds and so on fly across the world at breathtaking speed. Furthermore, advances in biotechnology result in new products promising to alleviate hunger, improve nutrition and reduce poverty of the majority of the world's population. These changes have at least to do with how justice is to be conceived, or so I think.

2

  These technological advances do not come without their own problems. The diffusion of information and communication technologies has created the so-called 'digital divide' between those who have access to the network and those who do not. The divide is particularly acute in developing countries where there is little diffusion, or the diffusion is restricted to the educated and urban sector of the population only. If being able to connect to the global network of communication actually brings in wide ranging benefits to those who are connected, then the digital divide is clearly a case of unequal distribution of resources. Moreover, the advances in biotechnology also create the problem, among others, of millions of farmers in the developing countries potentially being controlled by those who own the rights to the technologies. Hence, the farmers might have to be dependent on these products, and might be forced to relinquish their traditional ways of life.

Onora O'Neill:
Bounds of Justice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000.




3

  The problem is: How could we devise a conception of justice that can account for these technological advances? In the current era of globalization, where cultures intermingle, where can one find justice among the cultures? Is there one universal system of justice which all cultures should adopt? In her new book, Bounds of Justice,  1  Onora O'Neill argues that the traditional conception, which delimits justice only within the boundary of a particular nation-state, appears too parochial and unable to account for the contemporary condition of the globalized world. According to O'Neill, communitarian theories of justice have had a hard time dealing with global justice, namely justice transcending national borders, or in O'Neill's term "interstatal justice". The reason is that the communitarians base their arguments on a particular culture or tradition that is the basis of the identity of its members. Thus they seem to be at a loss to account for justice beyond borders. Her positive contribution is based on Kant's dictum that rules for action must be ones that are universalizable, non-arbitrary and followable by all. Applied to global justice, this means that governments, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations should abide by the rules based on the same model as those of Kantian ethics. Rules must be such that it is »possible for others to follow« (O'Neill 2000, 24).

4

  O'Neill is correct in saying that the usual conceptions of justice are based on a closed territory or a community of members sharing the same tradition. Hence these are quite inadequate in dealing with the contemporary issues arising from globalization and advances in technology. However, I am not quite sure that her Kantian answer would be all that is required for a plausible, full fledged theory of global social justice.  2  One still needs to pay attention to the roles local cultures and traditions play in such a conception of justice. This is so because, without taking local cultures and traditions into account, the conception of global justice turns out to be too formal and too remote from the everyday lives and practices of people anywhere. Surely, one needs a universal conception if one is to have a global theory of justice, but such a theory needs to be provided content if it is to be workable at all. The content needs to be found in the actual and concrete situations of a culture or a community. As whatever is global is only tenuously connected with real lives anywhere, so is any purely global conception of justice.



 Global Social Justice, Digital Divide, Genetically Modified
 Organisms


»In the cases of justice beyond national borders, the issue of who does the work of maintaining justice is murky.«

5

  Let us see more clearly what are the salient cases of global justice in the world today. The digital divide is potentially destabilizing since information is the source of power in today's world. Those connected will be better informed and more equipped to deal with vicissitudes, whereas those who are not will be marginalized. The gap would be wider if left unchecked. Which conception of justice could actually do justice to this situation? O'Neill points out that what she calls "transnational economic justice" (2000, 115-142) is beset with the problem of who or which agency actually is obliged to correct the situation. In the case of justice within a state, the problem is straightforward because there is the state power that takes care of maintaining order and justice.

6

  However, in the cases of justice beyond national borders, the issue of who does the work of maintaining justice is murky. One tends to think of intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations as an exemplar of such an agency. The United Nations and its subordinated organizations clearly represent a model of organizations which can provide global justice. However, it is well-known that in many cases the United Nations has failed in its missions. Since it cannot act alone without the majority or even unanimity of votes from the member states, its power is rather limited. Real power remains within the states' hands anyway. (And some states do have more power than others do.) An alternative to this might be a kind of world government holding sovereignty over all states and nations in the world. This conception, however, is deeply repugnant to most people, who rightly fear that a world government will become the world tyrant.

7

  O'Neill also mentions network organizations or NGOs such as the Amnesty International or the Medicins sans Frontieres as another example of agencies responsible for global justice. (2000, 182) The problem with these agencies, however, is that their power is quite limited. What they can do is usually nothing more than to research the situation and report it to the world. This is not to say that researching and reporting unjust situations is not important. Indeed it is very much so. The point is only that in some serious cases active intervention of the kind the United Nations have done might be required.

William J. McIver:
A Human Rights Perspective on the Digital Divide: The Human Right to Communicate.
2000.
external linkArticle


Jean Holcomb:
"The Digital Divide and Digital Justice: Do Clients Need a Technology Bill of Rights?"
In: Washington State Bar News 05/2000.
external linkArticle

8

  But how can the United Nations or the transnational NGOs do anything about the digital divide problem? One thing they have done quite extensively is to provide aids to those in need, and some other agencies, such as the World Bank or the European Union, may be pushing forward schemes aiming at closing the digital divide at this moment. However, without sensitivity to local cultures, such attempts would likely be regarded as imposition of one set of values originating in one culture on other cultures having their own value systems.

9

  Beside the fact that such imposition appears morally objectionable, the imposition would be far less effective in closing the digital divide than it would be if the scheme received full cooperation from the locals. This cooperation, then, requires that the scheme fit in with the local system of beliefs and practices. Closing the digital divide requires that villages be provided with computers and the infrastructure that makes global communication possible. And obviously only the hardware would not be sufficient if the villagers did not know how to operate them and find the best uses for it. The infrastructure, moreover, does not come in by itself. It does not seem to be the case that the villagers can maintain their traditional way of life in all respects when the infrastructure consisting of computer hardware, telephone lines and the knowledge required to operate them has become part of their lives. On the contrary, the hardware and the knowledge required carry with them certain sets of beliefs and practices that are different from the indigenous system of the locals. When computers and Internet connection are installed in a remote village in Thailand, for example, the way of life of the villagers will be invariably affected. First, electricity needs to be introduced; then telephone lines, computers, the expertise, and the jargons that come with modern personal computers need to be available too. All these are alien to the remote villages, and if the digital divide is to be closed, the villagers need to be able to utilize the global network for their benefits, but for that to be possible some aspect of their ways of life have to change.

10

  If this is indeed so, then it is hardly imaginable that local cultures do not have anything to do with attempts to close the digital divide for them. If justice is to be practical and workable, then one needs to be sensitive and be aware of the local practices and beliefs. One can talk about global justice in general; for example, one might talk about the need for global justice which is universal and applicable everywhere. However, if one talks only at the global level, without paying particular attention to a local instance, then the talk would be in danger of losing touch with the world altogether. If fruitful work in ethics or politics is to be practical, as O'Neill maintains (2000, 7), local cultural beliefs and practices need to be considered.

Alan Ryan et al.: Genetically modified crops: the ethical and social issues.
1999.
external linkBook


Ron Epstein:
"Ethical Dangers of Genetic Engineering".
In: Synthesis/Regeneration 20 (1999).
external linkArticle


Eric Beresford:
"The ethical implications of genetically modified food".
In: Anglican Journal, October 1999.
external linkArticle


11

  The same principle also applies in the case of recent advances in biotechnology. The introduction of agricultural products made of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has ignited a worldwide controversy. What concerns us here is the question of the justice of the practice of patenting the technology, making it impossible for farmers in developing countries to continue their traditional ways of life and their autonomy. Large corporations in the developed world keep the intellectual property rights to their products, which they sell to farmers in the developing countries. These farmers then stand a very good chance of getting themselves hooked by these products because of their effectiveness in combating plant diseases and so on. What could then happen is that farmers in the developing world could become dependent on the technology, and in the end it appears that the large multinational corporations will gain a tremendous amount of profits. Food, the basic stuff of life, would then be made of products patented to these corporations.

12

  Clearly, biotechnological issue is another case of global social and economic justice. Is it just for the large corporations to threaten the traditional ways of life of indigenous people by their technology? One argument in favor of genetically modified organisms is that the technology will lessen hunger, improve the nutritional content of food consumed by Third World population, and reduce impacts to the environment through less need for chemical pesticides. It is not within the scope of this paper to assess such sweeping empirical claims. However, it is quite clear that the ways of life of farmers in the Third World will have to change considerably if genetically modified agricultural products are widespread. A large proportion of the world's population, most notably in Europe, feel that they do not need genetically modified food; in fact many feel repelled by it, thinking that it is unnatural and thus unsuitable for consumption. In a sense, it can be said that the Europeans do not want their life styles, which include the food they eat, altered by the introduction of genetically modified food. The issue of global justice becomes more visible when multinational corporations, seeing that their biotechnological products are not welcome by the rich Europeans, try to force open the market in the developing world for their products. Considering the fact that these corporations are armed with a considerable amount capital and expertise, plus implicit or explicit backing of the world's richest countries, developing countries are at a huge disadvantage. This is clearly a case of global injustice.



 Justice, Technology and Culture

»Justice, if it is to be workable in a cultural entity, must be integral to the tradition or the normal practices of that entity.«




13

  The examples of information technology and biotechnology alluded to above show two contrasting presuppositions on justice. In the case of information technology, it appears that justice is served when the global communication network is introduced to remote villages. On the other hand, it appears that in the case of biotechnology, especially genetically modified organisms, there seem to be demands that products based on the technology be kept away from the population. Information technology clearly is not intrinsically better than biotechnology, and the presuppositions of the talks about the digital divide and the perceived risks of genetically modified organisms may be apparent than real. In any case, the question of justice in both cases is the same in structure. If the diffusion of information technology were indeed a good thing, then it would be unjust not to bring the network to the poor population of the Third World. On the other hand, if genetically modified organisms carry unacceptable risks, then to dump the food market with these products would also be unjust. In both cases the justice involved transcends national boundaries.

14

  Both kinds of technology share another common feature in that they have the potential to cause widespread changes and disruption in the life styles of the people to whom they are introduced. In the case of biotechnology, the change is obvious when we consider that how Third World farmers go about their businesses will have to change for good by the introduction or competition from the products of biotechnology. Thus, if global justice is to be viable, it seems necessary that this cultural factor needs to be considered. As it is too early now to establish beyond reasonable doubt that genetically modified food is safe, local cultural entities should have a say whether they would like to have the technologies in their domains. In addition, although it is scientifically proven safe, local cultures could still turn their backs against it if it finds that it prefers food whose genes are unmodified through artificial means. Thus if this cultural entity is forced to accept genetically modified food against its preferences stemming from their beliefs and cultures, then this act clearly violates the principle of justice.

»There is the big problem of how culture-based justice systems are related to the universal conception of justice that O'Neill talks about.«





15

  Therefore, justice and culture are linked in many ways. Firstly, justice, if it is to be workable in a cultural entity, must be integral to the tradition or the normal practices of that entity. Secondly, when cultures interact as closely as they are now due to globalization, one finds many cases of cultural intermingling, a result of which is that systems of practices born in one culture becoming "exported" to other cultures when the latter find such systems appealing and useful to them. Cultural practices do not remain static; instead cultures are always giving to and taking from other cultures. Thus, justice, being a set of practices and beliefs of a culture (which may well be an idealized one),  3  are dynamic in this way too. So it is entirely conceivable to find one practice of justice in one culture being carried over to another culture, which adopts roughly the same outline of practices.

16

  With the onset of the current technologies, such intermingling of cultures is happening at great speed. And this intermingling has created another serious problem. Cultural entities are not the same in material power. Hence, when there is intermingling, the unequal power held by those intermingling often creates instances of injustice. Cambodian farmers, for example, are much less powerful in their negotiations on GMOs when compared with the well-endowed representatives of the multinational corporations who have conducted expensive research and development effort on the technology. And what constitutes justice for the United States (e.g., that countries should open up their markets and be receptive to new technological advances such as genetically modified food), may not be the same as what constitutes justice for Cambodia (e.g., that Cambodian farmers should be provided with basic means to strengthen their communities and to earn enough so that some of their potentials could be realized). The crucial point here is that, if it is indeed true that what constitutes justice in these two cultural entities are not the same, then there is the big problem of how these culture-based justice systems (i.e., justice as integral to the practices of a culture) are related to the universal conception of justice that O'Neill talks about.



 Paucity of the Kantian Conception

»On a Kantian account, it is therefore a matter of obligation not to rely on fundamental principles of injury, violence, coercion, deception and the like, obligations which he groups under the heading of 'requirements to respect others' external freedom'.«

Onora O'Neill
(2000, 139)

17

  O'Neill's Kantian conception of global justice is based on the idea that justice must be non-arbitrary and premised upon an authority that is generally accessible. (2000, 12) That is to say, a conception of justice must be based on publicly verifiable reasoning and does not assume any sort of metaphysical authority that is not open to everybody. In O'Neill's argument for the Kantian conception of global justice, the basic tenet of Kant's ethics is applied to the principle of justice. Such principles must be "universally adoptable". They must be such that it is possible for everybody to adopt, and any such principles that do not respect universalizability must be rejected, as these presuppose that some are more privileged or have a higher status than others. Justice must be based upon principles which are universalizable. (2000, 65-80) Principles based on inequality cannot be those of justice because they are not universalizable. They cannot, in other words, be willed so as to become principles which everybody can adopt as their own guiding principles of action. In order to illustrate this point, O'Neill states:

18

  The picture of human life which Kant assumes is one in which agents with limited capacities and varied vulnerabilities interact; this picture is required if a universalizability criterion is to identify obligations of justice. The easiest way to see why certain principles cannot be universally adopted among finite and interacting beings is by a simple reductio ad absurdum thought experiment. If certain sorts of principle could (per impossibile) be universally adopted by mutually vulnerable interacting beings, then even moderate success in acting on them (at a level any rational beings must expect on the assumption that the principle is universally adopted) will render some others victims, and so unable to adopt those principles, which therefore (contrary to hypothesis) cannot be universally adopted. Examples of principles which can be identified as non-universalizable by this strategy include principles of injury, violence, coercion and deception. If (per impossibile) any of these principles were universally adopted among interacting but vulnerable beings, even a moderate success rate in acting on them (at a level any rational beings must expect on the assumption that the principle is universally adopted) would create at least some victims who (contrary to hypothesis) would be unable to adopt that principle. On a Kantian account, it is therefore a matter of obligation not to rely on fundamental principles of injury, violence, coercion, deception and the like, obligations which he groups under the heading of 'requirements to respect others' external freedom'. (2000, 138-139)

19

  This passage pretty much captures what O'Neill has to say on her Kantian conception of justice. Principles based on ingrained inequality cannot be those of justice because they are not universalizable. They cannot, in other words, be willed so as to become principles which everybody can adopt as their own guiding principles of action. Kant's requirement that one respects the "external freedom" of others is also based on this principle of equality of humans as rational beings. Under this conception, human beings are equal in the sense that they all are capable of reasoning. The principle is structured in such a way that reason alone could provide a foundation for a guiding principle of action.

20

  What is noticeable in Kant's (or Kantian) conception here is this view on human beings as rational beings who are equal. Regarded in another way, this seems to imply that Kant is not concerned with human beings in their various and fascinating characteristics. All these traits of what make one human being different from another – traits such as intelligence, artistic skills, sexual prowess, social status and so on – are neglected or bracketed away, and the focus is concentrated solely and exclusively on the one characteristic of rationality. And this one characteristic is emphatically not the same as reasoning skills – that one human being may be more adept at reasoning than another. What Kant is focusing on is not reasoning or rhetorical skills; instead he is looking for the least common denominator of what makes a human being a human being, namely their capability of reasoning and language use.

Gordon L. Ziniewicz:
Kant: The Ethical Imperative: The Good Will and Respect for Others.
1996.
external linkArticle


John W. Lango:
Is Kant's Ethics Overly Demanding?
Paideia World Philosophy Conference Paper.
1998.
external linkArticle

21

  O'Neill argues that her conception is immune from criticisms to the effect that Kantian ethics is formal and hence remote from actual lives. She distinguishes between abstraction and idealization. The former is what is required when one talks about many things having something in common, and she maintains that this is common even in ethical theories that emphasize the roles of communities and cultural traditions. Abstraction, according to her, is nothing controversial since talking about anything already presupposes some abstraction anyway. However, in her conception, idealization is another matter. One idealizes a situation or a principle when one chooses to concentrate on one or more aspects of the situation or the principle at hand and excludes others, or more seriously, when one asserts the absence of some predicates actually obtaining in the subjects being talked about, or when one asserts that some predicates obtain which in fact do not. (2000, 68) And to O'Neill, the task of constructing a theory of justice which is not based on idealizations still remain an open task, though, she argues, not shown to be impossible. (2000, 80) Thus, the charge that Kant's ethics suffers from "abstraction" and hence remote from real lives is answered by saying that any theory is abstract any way and abstractions are necessary not only for Kantian theories.

22

  When the Kantian conception of ethics is generalized to justice, the least common denominator of what is to qualify as a rational agent conceivably becomes something like the capability of an agent to enter a contractual agreement. This is similar to Rawls' idea that justice emerges from the "original position" where parties enter a contract not knowing their original social status, where they are from, nor who the other parties are.  4  Actual differences among the parties are abstracted away. This neglect of the actual status of particular individuals or parties entering the contract may be necessary if a scheme is to be found which is fair to all. One problem of such a scheme, however, is that it cannot be rich enough to provide a detailed guideline for action in many cases. What Kant offers as the guiding principle is a second-order principle to the effect that whatever principle for guiding action needs to be universalizable, accessible to all, and non-arbitrary. Kantian ethics, for example, does not tell us what to do in the case of the GMOs, whether we should adopt them or reject them. It tells us only how to construct rules that apply to cases like those of the GMOs or others.

 

23

  So here is the gist of my uneasiness with Kantian ethics in general. It is too formal and abstract and thus appears too weak to provide the kind of concrete guiding principle that people need to use when they are confronted with the need to take a decision. Certainly any theory must be abstract. But a theory that specifies satisfactory conditions for a concrete guideline for action cannot rest itself at that level only. I think this problem is particularly salient when we consider the problems of global justice arising from the digital divide and the genetically modified food that we discussed earlier. Since Kantian ethics deals with the principle of principles, it is always possible that there is room for more than one course of action, all following the second order principle.

24

  O'Neill herself acknowledges this point, (2000, 68-70) and she answers this charge by distinguishing between abstraction and idealization as we have seen. Since the maxim of justice provides only the necessary condition for any viable conception of actual justice, the maxim then underdetermines concrete action. Kantian conception of justice may not be wrong. But as a guiding principle for action one still needs yet other, more concrete guidelines which are at a level closer to actual reality than the Kantian conception could provide. Hence, in the case of the digital divide and the genetically modified food, what is needed is a set of first order guiding principles by means of which we know which action we should take.






Soraj Hongladarom:

"Global Culture, Local Cultures, and the Internet: the Thai Example".
In: AI & Society 13 (1999), 389-401.
external linkArticle

"On the Internet and Cultural Differences".
In: APA Newsletters on Computer and Philosophy. 97.2 (1998), 46-48.
external linkArticle

25

  It is quite difficult to conceive how such first order guiding principles could emerge from a vacuum without their being anchored in one specific tradition or another. In the case of the digital divide and the genetically modified food, what this anchoring in a tradition means is that the first order principles are informed by what the culture or the tradition says about the issues. Of course traditions come from too far back in the past to be able to inform us immediately what to do in the case of the digital divide or GMOs. But one could consult or to interpret one's traditions in order to find what one should do in these cases. For example, members the Thai culture might ponder what is the best course of action or what constitutes justice in the cases of the digital divide or genetically modified food. The decisions that members of the Thai culture make may or may not be exactly the same as those adopted by other cultures. This is to be expected. However, what is required is that these first order guiding principles follow the overall, second-order guideline or maxim similar to the kind Kant would provide. For if this were not the case, then where could claims for global justice find their source of persuasive power such that they could demand action from the responsible agencies? In short, if all there is to justice is one based on a particular culture, then how could a culture claim that it suffers from injustice by practices of another culture?

26

  I said "similar to" because in the case of global justice (which includes what O'Neill calls "interstatal" justice but also justice obtaining among transnational organizations which are themselves not states) it does not seem necessary to have a full fledged theory such as the one underlying Kant's ethics as the foundation of a second order principle that governs first order principles of action alluded to above. As Rawls has recently argued, what is required is only an "overlapping consensus" among the parties entering the deliberation.  5  When parties enter a deliberative process aiming at a resolution of some kind, what they should do, according to Rawls, is that they leave their own backgrounds and metaphysical theories behind and engage in a practical process which is required for a successful and non-violent deliberation. Thus, when parties representing various cultures or states get together to decide which course of action the whole group (the one which the cultures or the states regard themselves as members) should take, they must first decide on procedural rules governing how they conduct the meeting. Then they can begin the deliberation based on the agreed rules. The procedural rules cannot come from one particular vision of the Good or from a particular religion or from one particular culture. Instead they must always be a makeshift one, anything that members having diverse background in religions and cultures can agree upon. Any rules will do which members can agree on so that they can get on with the common task, and which would not put one party at a disadvantage.

Gordon L. Ziniewicz:
Kant: The Ethical Imperative: The Good Will and Respect for Others.
1996.
external linkArticle


John W. Lango:
Is Kant's Ethics Overly Demanding?
Paideia World Philosophy Conference Paper.
1998.
external linkArticle






27

  This deliberative process of finding out the procedural rules already presupposes a metaphysical theory, however minimal, and when people from different background meet to accomplish a common task, this minimal background must be present as a necessary condition. This minimal theory, however, could be coextensive with the empirical condition of humans in general, such as the capacity of understanding language. If the Kantian conception of justice that O'Neill is arguing for is actually to be adopted, it must be one that is shorn of much of Kant's own theoretical background supporting his conclusion. In fact this is what O'Neill herself offers in her book; however, she does not emphasize the obvious roles cultural traditions have to play in a conception of global justice. Even Rawls himself does not pay particular attention to the roles of various cultures. In his conception of political liberalism, parties entering the deliberating arena may have left their metaphysical baggage at home. But that does not and should not be taken to imply that the baggage is not important. On the contrary, effective implementation of justice seems impossible without taking in the local cultural traditions into consideration.

28

  To illustrate, Kant's categorical imperative: »Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law«  6  is in fact a more elaborate version of the Golden Rule: »Act toward others in such a way that you would like others to act to you.«  7  Something like the Golden Rule is required for the deliberation and a minimal conception of global justice to go on. The key point here is that this maxim is already shared in many cultures. There is a Thai proverb that one should make room for the heart of another in one's own heart. The meaning should be clear across cultures. One should sympathize with others and try to think and feel the same way that others do think and feel. It is but a short step from this saying to Kant's maxim. Furthermore, Confucius also taught the same thing in the Analects.

29

  These examples from cultures other than Kant's own late eighteenth-century East Prussian context show that it is possible for versions of the Golden Rule to appear in many cultures having no contact with one another. When parties representing various cultures come to the forum, they can come up with something like the Golden Rule, even though their own background supporting the rule can be widely different. When they meet with their fellows from other cultures, the basis of understanding and of communication is already quite thin. This is what happens when people from various countries and cultures meet to accomplish a task at hand. Firstly they adopt a common language, which may not be the same as the native tongue of anyone in the group (even though the common language is native of a portion of the group, they still have to make sure that the language they speak is understood by the other members of the group). Then they have to focus on the task and it is not possible to bring in local histories or traditions of one particular culture, as these would not be understood by other members who do not already share those traditions. Thus, each party in the deliberation may agree with the Golden Rule, but in their own terms and within their own traditions. When the parties in the intercultural deliberative group come back to their respective communities, they need to implement what they have agreed on in such a way that it accords with the local traditions. The global agreement needs to be supplemented with the local flavor, so to speak. Otherwise the task of realizing justice at the global and intercultural level may not be successful.



 Conclusion: Justice as Both Cultural and Intercultural





»Cultural, or 'thick' justice is part of the practices of one culture, and intercultural, or 'thin' justice is what happens when cultures interact, as they are doing intensively nowadays.«

30

  In this case, therefore, global justice obtains when members of a local culture deliberate among themselves as to the best course of action their cultural entity as a whole should take. The conception they come up with must agree with the minimal universal conception that every culture is capable of agreeing to be the underlying standard of global justice. Hence, a group that decides to take an action the whole world finds disagreeable and repugnant cannot claim that their action is based on a principle of justice. The Talebans claimed that their decision to demolish the ancient stone Buddha images in Afghanistan was derived from the teachings of Islam. But even most Islamic countries themselves have voiced their opposition to the action. This shows that the whole world finds such action disagreeable, and the Talebans are justly condemned by the world community. The Talebans cannot claim that their action can be justified by referring to their cultural tradition, because that would imply that global justice is not possible at all. The Buddha statues are valuable not only to Buddhists, but to all of humanity. This shows that the conception of culture-based justice being advocated here does not entail that any action adopted by a culture is acceptable.  8 

31

  However, the other way round – that all cultures should adopt the same conception of justice in all details – is not acceptable either. Since the digital divide is a case of global injustice, measures need to be found so that the problem is identified and concrete steps taken to redress the problem. What should exactly be done may not be the same in all societies. Different cultures have a different set of problems and priorities regarding the digital divide problem. In this case, we largely agree that the digital divide should be closed, but how to do it may be different from one place to another.

32

  The case of the genetically modified food is similar. Since it is still not scientifically proven that genetically modified food is absolutely safe (some scientists still voice their opposition against genetic manipulation), the most rational course is for members of a cultural entity to find a solution for themselves. They may search their own traditions for the solution.  9  Outsiders can do no more than provide suggestions and recommendations. They cannot force the decision or the outcome of the deliberation. Moreover, even though it is scientifically proven that the GM food is safe, a culture may still perceive it to be unnatural and prefer not to have it on their dinner tables. In this case the decision of the culture should be respected, and to force it to be otherwise would be unjust.

Michael Walzer:
Theories of Justice and Equality.
Question & Answer.
2000.
external linkVideo

33

  Justice, then, is both cultural and intercultural. Or in Michael Walzer's terms, justice can be both "thick" and "thin".  10  Discussing mainly moral arguments, Walzer argues that one should recognize that there are two conceptions of morality. Thick morality for Walzer is what is rooted in a culture, and thin morality is what enables members of one culture to recognize a moral issue in another culture that they can sympathize with. Walzer's own example is that of the protesters in Prague carrying banners saying "Truth" and "Justice" during their demonstration against the communist regime. Since most members of the world's cultures readily recognize the value of truth and justice, they feel that they are one with the Czech protesters and feel that they are ready to march with them. However, members of other cultures may not agree with the Czechs when it comes to the actual implementation, say, of distributive justice in the Czech Republic. And even the Czechs themselves might disagree among themselves as to what constitutes the optimal conception of justice that their country should adopt. What is there in the banners represents the thin morality for Walzer, and the actual implementation of truth or justice, which is based on particular cultures and traditions, represents the thick morality.

Soraj Hongladarom
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand.


34

  Cultural, or "thick" justice is part of the practices of one culture, and intercultural, or "thin" justice is what happens when cultures interact, as they are doing intensively nowadays. Thailand in the past used such measures as trial by fire or by water to settle cases of dispute. Europeans also had their fair share of cruelty and torture in their justice systems too. These practices used to be part of the culture-based justice system of respective traditions. But as countries become modernized, these practices are abandoned for the more humane treatment we are familiar with today. Modernization may not be the same as Westernization or Americanization. However, the point is that modernization comes together with increased interaction among countries and cultures, for better or for worse. Justice, residing within the bounds of a cultural universe, then expands to accommodate this interaction between cultures and becomes intercultural. Intercultural justice, furthermore, is neither rooted within one particular tradition, nor cut loose from it. Here lies the dynamism of intercultural justice; it is always a makeshift thing, an unending process in which parties bargain, quarrel and negotiate noisily as to what constitutes it. Even though it lacks philosophical foundation, it in fact is strong due to the participating parties' conviction that without it communication and cooperation across cultures is not possible.  11 


Notes


 1   

Onora O'Neill (2000): Bounds of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

 2   

In his article (1997) "Kantian Ethics and Global Justice" (In: Social Theory & Practice 23.1, 53-74), Kok-chor Tan argues that Kantian ethics is immune to the charge that his ethics is too remote from the actual realities where justice is applied. His argument is basically that Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties does not entail that one does not have perfect duties to promote and protect the well beings of others. One has a perfect duty when it is one's positive duty to take an action; on the other hand, one has an imperfect duty when one does not have to take a positive action, since it does not specify exactly what action is to be done, and it is ultimately up to the subject to decide whether he or she will act on the duty or not. Tan argues that one still has the duty to alleviate injustices in the world, and this duty is not an imperfect one because even though the injustices are not the results of one's own action, it is still the result of somebody else's action and there is a positive duty to stop conditions causing sufferings or injustices in the world. However, Tan focuses more on the duty that an individual must take in order to alleviate injustice. He does not pay attention to the need for sensitivity to different cultures in deliberating on justice or injustice. A case of wrongs must indeed be redressed, but actually how to do this does not seem to be supplied in full in Kantian ethics, even according to Tan's interpretation. 

 3   

For an anthropological perspective on the concept of justice in cultures, see W. Fikentscher (1991): "The Sense of Justice and the Concept of Cultural Justice". In: American Behavioral Scientist 34, 314-335. 

 4   

John Rawls (1971): A Theory of Justice. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press. 

 5   

John Rawls (1993): Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 

 6   

Robert Paul Wolff (ed.) (1969): Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant, transl. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 44. 

 7   

This is so because if one does not act toward others in such a way that one wants others to act toward himself or herself, then one does not act according to a universalizable maxim. For one would then separate oneself from others, violating the requirement of equality. Some may argue that the Golden Rule does not work in the case of a masochist, who inflicts pain on others and do not mind others inflicting pain on him. However, such a masochist would then separate himself from others because others are not masochists. Taken literally, the Golden Rule does not prohibit the masochist, but the Rule is premised on the assumption that human beings are to be treated equally. 

 8   

Perhaps the reason why the demolition of the Buddha statues has aroused such intense reaction from Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike is that the action is irreversible. Once the Buddhas are destroyed, they are destroyed forever. Hence it is just to condemn such an action, especially by the world community. I have argued elsewhere in this paper that, in the case of GM food, it is all right for a culture to decide not to take it, even though it is proven safe for consumption. Here it appears unjust to condemn the culture that decides not to take GM food. A culture that decides not to eat GM food may reverse its decision later on, but a culture that destroys unique cultural artifacts cannot do so. 

 9   

I have argued this point in a viewpoint submitted to the Harvard Center for International Development at external linkhttp://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/cments/cments115.htm

 10   

Michael Walzer (1994): Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 

 11   

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change at Assumption University, Bangkok, Thailand, on May 9-11, 2001. I benefited greatly from the discussions and interactions with my colleagues from around South-East Asia. I would like particularly to thank Prof. Kirti Bunchua, Prof. Worayuth Srivorakul, and Prof. George MacLean for their help with the paper. Research for this paper is supported by a grant from the Thailand Research Fund, n° BRG/14/2544. 



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